If vigorous and contentious debate were the primary criterion by which to judge the health of an academic discipline, then the field of modern Japanese philosophy must properly be seen as flourishing. It is certainly remarkable that, at least in the English-language publications that represent Japan studies in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere, the intensity of the debate on twentieth-century Japanese philosophy, and on the Kyoto School in particular, seems considerably greater than that of other debates or discussions that have taken place in recent years in the fields of modern Japanese history or literature. This is all the more surprising given the small size of this field of philosophy relative to the parallel disciplines of history and literature, as these latter of course wield vaster institutional resources and attract far larger numbers of scholars. At the same time, however, it is equally surprising that the debate on the Kyoto School remains for the most positions 17:1
part confined to those scholars who deal explicitly with the topic of modern Japanese philosophy in their writings. This debate is virtually unknown outside this small circle of scholars, or, if known, it is generally treated as a matter of little interest, unrelated to those facts, figures, and movements that, existing putatively outside philosophy, constitute the lion's share of Japan studies research. What at least partly accounts for this neglect is the fact that Kyoto School philosophy, with which this debate is concerned, is regarded as a mere object of inquiry, and hence more or less equivalent to other objects of inquiry as they relate to the entity Japan. This is institutionally somewhat puzzling, especially in light of the increased interest in and demand for what is most commonly called "theory" (critical theory, literary theory, etc.) in Asian studies scholarship over the past two decades. Clearly this interest and demand have been motivated by primarily methodological factors, such that general or overarching frameworks are adopted through which to better comprehend and make sense of the diverse manifold of particular Japanese objects.
Much could be said about the implications of this relation between the method and object of inquiry, but for our purposes here let us simply remark that such distinction between theory and philosophy breaks down rather quickly. The reduction of Kyoto School philosophy to a mere object of inquiry, devoid of any broader methodological value, functions to draw attention away from both the theoretical insights and the theoretical (and practical) problems found in these texts. This is unfortunate given the fact that these insights and problems bear profound similarities to much theoretically oriented research being conducted today in Japan studies -and, indeed, in the humanities and social sciences as a whole. This is of course not to suggest that Japan studies scholarship should draw on the theoretical resources of Japanese philosophy rather than "western" theory, as if the former somehow represented a more organic or immediate synthesis between research object and research method. (Such conception can be found among a not inconsiderable number of Kyoto School texts, which thus teach us, wittingly or unwittingly, the dangers of certain nativist presuppositions in scholarship, many of which still powerfully inform the framework of Japan studies in the United States, for example.) What it does suggest, however, is that such crucial problematics confronted in the texts of Kyoto School phi-losophy as, for instance, subjectivity, East-West relations, theory versus practice, nationalism, imperialism, universalism and particularism, modernity, alterity, sociality, community, and poiesis are of direct relevance to the most important topics challenging the field of Japan studies today. All research within this field, regardless of academic discipline or the specificity of the object of inquiry, can, through a critical engagement with these texts, gain a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of what it means first of all to write on Japan. For political, historical, and intellectual reasons, such an understanding is all the more urgent given that the attention to theoretical questions in the field remains in many cases merely cosmetic, and therefore fully accommodating of the various ways institutional structures successfully replicate themselves.
Let us say a brief word about this debate on the Kyoto School and how it relates to our own project before turning our attention to the individual essays included in this volume. Rather than list the names of the participants in the debate and the several key texts that form its major coordinates, it appears to us far more important to underline the larger issues at stake, because these function to divide the two contending camps from one another. In a nutshell, the debate concerns the political status of Kyoto School philosophy, with particular regard to those texts written during the period of Japan's Fifteen-Year War (1931 -45). On the one hand, certain scholars have read Kyoto School philosophy in a way that privileges the philosophical thrust of these texts over the political. For these scholars, it is the elaboration of concepts, the formulation of something like a philosophical system, and the dialogue with thinkers of the past that take center stage in the writings of such philosophers as Nishida Kitar, Tanabe Hajime, Watsuji Tetsur (whose affiliation with the school was comparatively looser), and Nishitani Keiji, to name but the most well-known figures. Any attempt to criticize the political aspects of these thinkers' work is seen, however implicitly, as doing violence to the priority accorded to philosophy, and it is this violence that renders such critiques more or less inessential, of historical and biographical interest, perhaps, but ultimately incapable of touching on the conceptual core of Kyoto School thought. On the other hand, a quite different group of scholars has attempted to read these texts in precisely the opposite fashion, emphasizing that philosophy as a product of existing political and historical conditions cannot avoid becoming caught up and participating in larger ideological formations, the effects of which constitute something like a text's unconscious that persists despite the thinker's explicit philosophical intentions. From the perspective of these scholars, interpreting Kyoto School philosophy strictly with regard to the philosophical conceptuality developed in the texts is tantamount to neglecting those external conditions that made such thought possible in the first place; this would be to repeat the misconception held by the Kyoto School philosophers themselves -if not, indeed, all philosophers -that philosophical discourse takes place in a sociohistorical vacuum, as it were, and thus gives way to an excessive abstraction that is necessarily contradicted by the everydayness of empirical reality.
However different from one another, both these camps have much of value to say about the Kyoto School, and this point must first of all be acknowledged when approaching the debate. What we would like to emphasize, however, is that in the discourse of philosophy there can be no natural priority of either the philosophical over the political or the political over the philosophical. Instead it becomes necessary to speak here, following Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, of "the essential (and not accidental or simply historical) co-belonging of the philosophical and the political." 1 What this means, first of all, is that philosophy does not inhabit a space that is in any way outside the political. At the same time, however, philosophy is not simply identical to it. If there is no philosophy, including of course that of the Kyoto School, that can ever exempt itself from the constraints and exigencies of the political, then it must also be said, conversely, that the political will always have something philosophical about it, and this for essential (rather than merely empirical) reasons. Among other things, this insight helps us become more vigilant against the trap of reducing these two spaces into one another. In the context of the debate over Kyoto School philosophy, for example, it is possible to discern among those scholars who privilege the philosophical over the political a desire, ultimately, to reduce the latter to the former. The dangers here are several, among which we might note an insufficient attentiveness to the historical problematic of the Japanese empire and its mission to actively shape or form (in the sense of Bildung [keisei, tya]) Japanese subjects from among the colonized by instilling in them a broadened sense of Japanese identity. This conjoining of the philosophical and the political manifested itself in the need to reconceptualize national identity on the basis of a more expansive imperial identity 2 -such that, in dialectical fashion, a putatively original and positive Japanese identity comes to be negated by non-Japanese elements the better to synthesize these latter in the creation of imperial subjects who, collectively, identify with the mission of the empire -and to this effect a whole range of notions connected with subjective identity and subjective formation were formulated and reworked by various Kyoto School thinkers. This point is imperative to recall, and at no time more so than when those scholars who read the Kyoto School texts primarily philosophically at the cost of the political articulate their defense of the school on the basis of its alleged "pluralism" or "internationalism," for these are precisely the elements that must be stressed in the formation of the nation that is at once an empire with extensive colonial holdings. Nevertheless, this problematic of subjective identity in the context of empire building cannot be said to be grasped by those scholars who tend to reduce the philosophical to the political. Due in part to what is otherwise an admirable sense of political urgency and responsibility (and this point must not be overlooked), this group all too often commits an interpretive violence in their reading of the Kyoto School texts such that they come to be denuded of their inherent philosophical complexity. In order to understand these texts qua philosophy, attention must first of all be paid to such things as the conceptual rigor with which arguments are formulated, the various demands that structures or logics impose on thought, and the "internal" relations that bind certain concepts together while at the same time distinguishing them from others. Failure to respect these conventions effectively stunts the critical force with which these texts demand to be read and can moreover very easily lead to a form of politics that is incapable in its haste of developing concepts whose complexity equals that of the political phenomena in question. With respect to the problematic -at once philosophical and politicalof subjective identity in the historical context of the Japanese empire, for example, these scholars of the political tend to fall back on an empiricist viewpoint according to which subjective identity is more or less regarded as actual, that is to say, given in its empirical immediacy. In this way, subjective identity comes to be associated with the past in its fixedness or unchangeability. The central difficulty with this view, however, is that the very success of Japan's imperial mission depended on a notion of subjective identity that was essentially grounded on the notion of potentiality, the temporal mode of which is the future. It is the future that effectively negates or incapacitates those given elements bestowed on humans as their proper -i.e., that which appears to be most immediately or originally their own -subjective traits, as for example biological parentage, skin color, body type, geographic birthplace, or linguistic community. In order to understand the dynamics of subjective identity, then, a radical shift is required from such interrelated notions as actuality, the past, and identity to those of potentiality, the future, and identification. When reading the texts of the Kyoto School, it is clear that these philosophers had an unparalleled grasp of this problematic of identity, on the basis of which they were able to address the complex issue of subjective transformation vis-à-vis the larger historical movement of sekaishi, or world history. An inability to rigorously take this problematic into account as part of one's overall critique of Kyoto School discourse suggests that many of the central and, we believe, most politically urgent elements of Kyoto School philosophy remain yet untouched. Now the problem is that, while this inability might appear at first glance to be a primarily philosophical one, it results in rather severe political misunderstandings of the text. (Among other things, a condemnation of Kyoto School discourse for its political conceptuality of immediacy -for instance, the charge that it appropriated the Nazi ideology of "blood and soil," etc. -when it was in fact the notion of mediation that was so vital to these philosophers' thinking of subjective formation, on both individual and national [minzoku] levels.) Or rather, the misunderstandings that emerge here are indissociably philosophical and political, for they involve questions that, regardless of their external appearance, belong no more to one of these spaces than they do to the other. Nevertheless, it must be said -and this is in no way a contradiction, but rather part of the valuable legacy of these scholars -that these misunderstandings actually enable us to better identify what traps to avoid when reading Kyoto School philosophy "politically"; they teach us the need to formulate new concepts and interpretive strategies with which to read these texts both respectfully and violently, as it were, the latter understood in the sense of diverging from the philosophers' own explicit intentions so as to reveal otherwise hidden elements and logics at work.
As part of our general assessment of the Kyoto School, for example, it would be crucial to read the wartime texts of Nishitani Keiji -which, as is well known, form a major part of this debate -in such a way as to highlight neither simply their philosophical depth nor their political dangers, as if these represented two separate aspects or moments, but rather those philosophical strands in which appear precisely what is most at stake and of gravest concern politically. Here it is impossible for us to do more than merely sketch out the contours such a reading might follow. Very schematically, then, one might isolate Nishitani's central notion of "subjective nothingness" (shutaiteki mu), which he inherits from his mentor Nishida, and, while acknowledging its remarkable force in revealing how the question of man necessarily escapes all regional or ontic determinations that seek to present man as a positive entity, show how this notion nevertheless comes to link up in the most egregious fashion with the Japanese state and its wartime mobilization of citizens. In order to illustrate this point, let us quote a passage from Nishitani's contributing essay to the 1942 "Overcoming Modernity" symposium, titled " 'Kindai no chkoku' shiron" ("My Views on 'Overcoming Modernity' "):
First of all, the state requires of its citizens both mastery in one's work and self-sacrifice (or self-annihilation) in one's work activities. The demand for mastery is the most realistic and concrete in one's daily life, and involves the most external action, whereas the demand for self-annihilation is the most internal of one's feelings and soul, and involves the most interior aspect of one's daily life. The path of religiosity that is subjective nothingness is able to directly penetrate both these aspects as one. It can be said that mastery belongs to the sphere of technology, broadly understood. In "liberalism," mastery is often employed for the pursuit of personal gain. But today this mastery must be penetrated by the most fundamental spirit of national ethics (kokumin rinri), as in the notion of "self-annihilation in devotion to the nation" (messhi hk). This ethics is fundamentally tied to religion. Hence the standpoint of subjective nothingness is the path that runs through the three spheres of technology (in a broad sense), ethics and religion, and represents the religious standpoint that can be uncovered through a national ethics within real work activities. 3 These lines show Nishitani employing the otherwise radically negative concept of "subjective nothingness" for the positive end of national mobilization. Now one could easily condemn Nishitani for this move, as many have done, but such criticism is of ultimately limited value if it does not attempt to engage the text on its own terms, that is to say, philosophically, by unraveling the logic that is being worked out here so as to grasp the precise dynamics of this mobilization. Specifically, the concept of nothingness comes to be drained of its critical force (given its essential status as irrevocably other to what is) by Nishitani's figuration of it, which is of course a figuration of the unfigurable par excellence. In this passage, nothingness appears as linked with the Japanese state. Rather than demonstrating how the state would necessarily be threatened by this concept, however, Nishitani suggests that the state is capable of positively utilizing nothingness through a kind of double negation, such that subjective nothingness comes to be the condition for the state's presence. It is through the figure of nothingness that subjects are made to identify with the Japanese state, which maintains its unity only through that identification. Here we might also observe that this figuration of nothingness begins even earlier for Nishitani, since this concept is said to be properly "Oriental" in origin. ("As goes without saying," he writes, "this standpoint of subjective nothingness is a feature of Oriental religiosity.") 4 Yet the problem here is that once nothingness comes to be figured as Oriental, it immediately loses its quality of radical negativity and allows itself to be governed by what is otherwise the much more derivative logic of oppositionality or contradiction, since Oriental nothingness can only be that which Western being is not. More important, it is through the figuration of nothingness that subjective identification takes effect in its mobilization -that is, assembling or gathering -of individuals as Orientals, i.e., nonwesterners. What this suggests is that the figure of nothingness is, in Nishitani's text, essentially mobilizing, given that its appearance or presentation sets in motion an identificatory process of subject formation (e.g., subjects formed as Orientals, subjects formed as citizens subject to the Japanese state, etc.). Regardless of whether Nishitani explicitly links the figure of nothingness with the various work projects of national mobilization, therefore, the fact is that such mobilization is already underway the moment that nothingness yields to figuration. In philosophical terms, this essential mobilization functions as the condition for all subsequent empirical mobilizations.
In their relative inattention to philosophy, many critics of the Kyoto School's politics have overlooked this and other important points that could in fact aid them in their critique. Even in terms of this particular concept of mobilization (which, let us note, has appeared far more frequently in leftist attacks on the Kyoto School in Japanese-language publications), all too often the focus on the conventional, empirical sense of this term functions to obfuscate the fact that Japanese subjects are what they are only as a result of the formation that takes place through "mobilization." Despite appearances, then, it is not the case that the violence of Japan's mobilization emerges primarily in the context of marshalling bodies and resources for the nation's wartime action. Even prior to this, the coming together of a Japanese people or community qua Japanese (which, contra historiography, does not simply take place in any historical past but rather at each and every relevant discursive instance) is the site of the original, if constantly repeated, violence of mobilization. It is to this site, we believe, that critical focus must be directed, and this in order to avoid the trap -still powerfully operative in Japan studies today -of viewing Japan as in any way a substantial entity. Notwithstanding the many significant contributions made to our knowledge of the Kyoto School on the part of those scholars who have participated in the debate over the school's politics, it remains the case that an excessively empirical understanding of Japan all too easily blinds one to the discursive conditions in which Japanese subjective identity comes to be produced. Given that many of the Kyoto School philosophers themselves were fully cognizant of this problematic in their attempt to think through some of the most urgent questions underlying social or political existence, neither an approach that privileges the philosophical over the political nor one that privileges the political over the philosophical can be said to properly take this matter into account. It is in this context, perhaps, that the postwar critic and China scholar Takeuchi Yoshimi might offer a clue as to how best to proceed in our reading of the Kyoto School texts. As one of the pioneering critics of the Kyoto School's wartime political discourse, Takeuchi articulated the need to read philosophy "politically" without, however, fall-ing victim to the traps such an approach potentially poses. As he writes in his 1959 essay "Kindai no chkoku" ("Overcoming Modernity"),
The China Incident was irresolvable, and the Pacific War began as a means to indefinitely postpone its resolution. Hence the war could of course only be eternal warfare. While the Kyoto School was able to explain this eternal warfare on paper, they were incapable of resolving it. . . . Perhaps it was possible to conceptually transcend the 'inferior oppositionality between war and peace' through a philosophy of 'absolute nothingness,' but this was not the issue. What logic is required for thought to act effectively on reality? Such logic was never discovered during the war, and it remains undiscovered even now. 5 This "logic" (ronri) of which Takeuchi speaks to bridge the gap between thought and reality is ultimately, we believe, the same logic required to more effectively address the political aspects of Kyoto School philosophy -neither a reading of this philosophy that makes light of the real political exigencies that were (and are still today) at stake, then, nor an approach that remains theoretically unequipped to deal with the level of philosophical complexity involved. For it is still a question of logic that presents itself here as the means by which to read these texts critically, remaining close enough to the internal workings of these texts so as to respectfully follow their conceptual gestures and operations (and, what is just as important, their hesitations and inconsistencies), while at the same time violently resisting their pull -not from the putatively extra-logical or extra-textual space of empirical everydayness, for instance, but rather from a more general or universal outside that, paradoxically, governs philosophy in its very interiority.
It is on the basis of this principle of the "co-belonging" of the philosophical and the political that the present project was commenced with the hope of shedding new light on the state of Japanese philosophy during the FifteenYear War. This does not mean, of course, that each of the essays collected in this volume develops or articulates this principle in precisely the same manner. Differences in methodology, reading strategy, and style are immediately apparent, and attention should be paid to them. Nevertheless, all these essays emerged out of an awareness of the difficult tension between philosophy and the political, and in this sense they represent something like an intervention in the debate I have outlined above.
In terms of these individual essays, Chris Goto-Jones calls attention to the implicit Eurocentrism underlying the field of political philosophy, which in its exclusive focus on the West has ignored many of the significant contributions to this discipline made by various members of the Kyoto School. In an important move, Goto-Jones enables something like a return of the repressed to take place by showing that the Kyoto School texts of the past had during the war already identified and analyzed these western strategies of exclusion. Lewis E. Harrington provides an informative account of the Marxist philosopher and critic Miki Kiyoshi's philosophical and journalistic writings, with particular focus on his 1939 manifesto Principles of Thought for a New Japan. Harrington argues that the intellectually open and questioning attitude that marked Miki's early journalism gradually gave way to a more dogmatic and politically dangerous stance, as represented by his concept of "cooperativism." John Namjun Kim also deals with the politicophilosophical thought of Miki in the context of his defense of Japan's imperialist mission on the basis of the concept of cosmopolitanism. It is this conception that brings to light the inherent tension between the promise of freedom and actual imperial subjection, thereby allowing us to better understand the link between past and present imperial projects. Takeshi Kimoto presents a detailed reading of the third roundtable session of the 1941 -42 symposium "World-Historical Standpoint and Japan," which was devoted to the issue of "total war." In asking whether there might not be an intrinsic rather than external or accidental relation between Kyoto School philosophy and this notion of total war, Kimoto focuses on the antinomies that he sees haunting this notion.
Aaron Stephen Moore analyzes the notion of technology in the fascinating if much-neglected work of the aesthetics philosopher Nakai Masakazu. Moore rightly calls attention to the need to grasp technology more broadly for an enhanced understanding of political phenomena, since this notion directly concerns the production of subjects as active participants within social formations. In what is unmistakably a major (and highly polemical) contribution to our understanding of Japanese philosophical and intel-lectual historical scholarship, the essay by Naoki Sakai indicates certain historico-structural problems that have beset the English-language academic discourse on modern Japanese thought. Sakai traces these problems back to the co-figurative positionality inherent in Asian studies research, while at the same time underlining the significant commonalities between past Japanese fascism and the U.S. ultranationalism of the present. Finally, Christian Uhl discusses some of the political and intellectual stakes involved in the course of Takeuchi Yoshimi's reading of the Kyoto School, and particularly of Nishida Kitar. Intellectual historians in Japan have long referred to Takeuchi's denunciation of the school's wartime discourse in the late 1950s, but through an examination of Takeuchi's early writings Uhl reveals that this rejection of the Kyoto School took place only after he had been thoroughly influenced by its thought.
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